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History is a science, no more and no less
Professor JB Bury
Inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History
University of Cambridge, 1903
The Gulf Coast Disaster of September 2005 has changed
the entire paradigm of how we view public health. Our
previous visions of disaster relief were predicated on the
premise that the most effective after care would involve
treating the direct effects of catastrophic, unpredicted
trauma. Survivors would be readily amenable to first aid at the
scene, followed by evacuation from the area. Involved
hospitals and care stations had tables of organization to
manage disasters and held regular drills to ensure familiarity
with them. Organizational routes to import volunteers were
planned years in advance. It was thought that the aftermath of
a natural disaster would be quelled in direct proportion to the
amount of effort put into direct action at the scene.
From a historical perspective, there were some major
differences between other recent calamities and the Gulf
Coast disaster. On 7 December 1988, a severe earthquake
struck Armenia, a small country in the former republic of the
Soviet Union [1]. The quake, lasting 20 s, was estimated to
be as destructive as 120 atomic bombs, destroying 21 towns
and 302 villages in seconds. It killed 25,000 people, injured
19,000, and rendered 540,000 homeless [2]. Following the
quake, virtually every public service, including water,
electricity, transport, fire rescue, and health care, was either
destroyed or damaged beyond use. All communication
became unreliable. However, considering the circumstances,
the local public services’ response to the injured was rapid
and reasonably effective. Rescuers maximized whatever
facilities were available, set up first aid centers, triaged
patients, and transported the injured back to areas outside
the immediate damage area however possible. They were
content to do what we could with what they had, and the
outcome seemed as good as could be expected. The basic
paradigm of disaster care changed little.
On 11 September 2001, an unexpected man-made disaster
hit New York City. Again, traditional forces were mobilized as
they were designed to do [3]. However, we noticed some
remarkable quandaries. The capability of the systems did not
seem to match the quality and extent of the disaster [4]. The
number of actual survivors was too small to utilize effectively
the existing network of receiving facilities [5]. Mobilization of
technologically advanced rescue systems to the scene
generated manpower excesses and logistical difficulties that
outweighed the benefit [6]. Search and rescue volunteers
entering the site were found to be not only ineffective but also
counterproductive [7]. Designated facilities were capable of
doing a little for many, but not so capable of doing a lot for
few. Rescue systems maintained sensitivity but lacked
specificity. For both of these previous disasters existing
services functioned as they were designed to, but they were
designed based on concepts of disaster that had not yet
been realized.
The Gulf Coast disaster shattered all our previous
conceptions. We knew what it was, saw it coming, set up our
systems in advance, watched it strike, and then we watched
our systems repeatedly fail. Bureaucratic inefficiency and
road congestion prevented efficient pre-emptive escape.
Administrative personnel did not follow their own disaster
plans. Rescuers in place were compromised by the enormity
of the event. There was no way to get rescuers or materials in
or survivors out of the area. Communications were
intermittent and unreliable. Existing shelters were either
destroyed or rendered inhospitable. Emergency shelters large
enough for the mass of survivors were poorly designed for
that purpose. Riots and looting complicated the continuing
rescue effort.
The consequences extended further than any other disaster
in modern American history. What was thought to be a public
health crisis quickly evolved into a public welfare dilemma.
There were no systems in place to manage thousands of
homeless people in the long term and move them to safety
from unprovisioned and uninhabitable expedient shelters.
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Provision of housing, food, clothing, law enforcement,
schools, jobs, social welfare, and control of infectious disease
were unexplored issues in the care of huge populations made
homeless by widespread catastrophe.
These inconsistencies in our preconceived notions of how to
deal effectively with disasters must be faced head on.
Accordingly, this section of Critical Care utilizes a
multidisciplinary cast of expert observers, some of whom
were physically present in the Gulf Coast disaster area, to
examine some of the important lessons. Issues covered
include the following: dealing with bureaucratic inefficiency;
systems inadequacy from within and without the disaster
area; dealing with the specter of military intervention and the
potential of martial law; and understanding communications
issues – what we have, what we need, and what we can
expect in the future. History must be written by and for the
survivors. We can no longer afford to ignore Toynbee’s famous
quip: ‘Those who forget history are doomed to repeat it.’
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